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Abstract
This paper quantitatively conceptualizes the Bank of Japan ?BOJ?’s policy de-
cisions by employing Bernanke and Mihov’s ?1998? econometric methodology
for developing monetary policy measures. The paper shows that, in the
subperiod to March 2001, the call rate alone should be used as the policy indica-
tor of the BOJ. However, in the subperiod from April 2001, an equally weighted
average of the call rate and reserves should be used. Furthermore, the paper
presents a useful measure of BOJ policy that identifies its past policy decisions
over time.
JEL classification : C32 ; E52 ; E58
Keywords : monetary policy measure, structural vector autoregression,
discount-window policy, reserve market, Japanese monetary policy
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1 Introduction
Accurate evaluation of monetary policy requires an adequate policy indicator.
In the context of studies of U.S. monetary policy, Bernanke and Blinder ?1992?
argued that the federal funds rate has been the primary policy target of the
Federal Reserve ?Fed?. Christiano and Eichenbaum ?1992? used non-borrowed
reserves as the policy indicator, and Strongin ?1995? proposed using the compo-
nent of non-borrowed reserves growth that is orthogonal to total reserve growth.
While these studies suggest quantitative indicators based on monetary variables
for the Fed’s past policy decisions, Romer and Romer ?1989? and Boschen and
Mills ?1991? suggested more qualitative indicators. Romer and Romer used pub-
lications of the Fed, such as minutes of the policy committee and other state-
ments of the decision-making bodies, to extract information on the key policy
actions taken. Building on Romer and Romer’s work, Boschen and Mills rated
monetary policy on a discrete scale.
Past studies of Japanese monetary policy ?e.g., Honda and Kuroki ?2006?,
Miyao ?2000, 2002?, Ogawa ?1999? and Hatakeda ?1997?? have assumed that
the Bank of Japan ?BOJ? has always implemented policy by changing the call
rate, and that the behaviour of the call rate reflects the BOJ’s policy decisions
over time. However, does this assumption always apply when analysing
Japanese monetary policy? Since July 1995, the call rate has hardly moved from
around zero ?see Figure 1?. Since March 2001, the BOJ has adopted a new pol-
icy framework, which has involved expanding reserves as often as lowering the
call rate. Furthermore, previous studies of the BOJ’s policy indicators for the pe-
riod up to June 1995, when the call rate remained positive and subject to change,
do not necessarily support the view that only the call rate reflects the BOJ’s
??
policy decisions. For example, Shioji ?2000? and Nakashima ?2006? identified
policy indicators of the BOJ to June 1995 by using a structural vector
autoregression ?VAR? methodology
???
. The former showed that the call rate and
quantity indicators, such as M2+CD, and high-powered money, are useful as in-
dicators of the BOJ’s policy, and the latter showed that the call rate is the best
indicator of the BOJ’s policy.
This paper attempts to conceptualize quantitatively the BOJ’s policy decisions
by employing Bernanke and Mihov’s ?1998? structural vector autoregression
methodology. Their methodology enables us to develop monetary policy meas-
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??? Shioji ?2000? employed the identifying methodology of Sims ?1986? that imposes
a contemporaneous restriction on all economic variables in a VAR system, assuming
that at least a subset of goods market variables are predetermined to model the
Japanese high-powered money market. On the other hand, Nakashima ?2006? em-
ployed Bernanke and Mihov’s ?1998? methodology that divides the macroeconomy into
a policy sector and a non-policy sector, and after assuming a block recursive structure
between the two sectors, imposes a contemporaneous restriction on monetary variables
in the policy sector.
Figure 1 : Call Rate and Discount Rate
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ures of central banks and to clarify their operating procedures by formulating
equilibrium econometric models of the reserve market. In general, central banks
aim to stabilize the macroeconomy by intervening in the reserve market and by
setting reserves or short-term interest rates, such as the federal funds rate and
the call rate, within a target range. The methodology assumes that monetary
variables that are affected by the operating procedures of central banks in the re-
serve market embody the decisions of central banks.
When applying Bernanke and Mihov’s ?1998? econometric methodology to
Japanese monetary policy, however, we take extreme care. Bernanke and Mihov
developed an equilibrium model of the U.S. reserve market to discuss the Fed’s
operating procedures and to construct a quantitative policy measure of the Fed.
In this paper, by thoroughly applying Bernanke and Mihov’s econometric meth-
odology to Japanese monetary policy, we consider the following : ?1? the institu-
tional differences between the U.S. and Japanese reserve markets, and ?2? the
shift in the BOJ’s discount-window policy in July 1995. The former involves for-
mulating a model of the Japanese reserve market that differs from that developed
by Bernanke and Mihov for the U.S. reserve market. The latter involves
modelling two equilibrium models of the Japanese reserve market : one each for
before and after July 1995. In particular, to identify the BOJ’s policy indicator
over time, we present two original models of the Japanese reserve market. Each
model captures the institutional features of the Japanese reserve market and re-
flects the difference in the BOJ’s operating procedures before and after the BOJ
changed its discount-window policy.
As previously discussed, in exploring the BOJ’s policy indicator, Shioji ?2000?
and Nakashima ?2006? did not cover the period from July 1995. Accordingly,
they did not consider the shift in the BOJ’s discount-window policy in July 1995.
??
In this paper, by carefully considering the BOJ’s policy shift, we cover the period
from July 1995 and thereby complement their analysis. In particular, by using the
two equilibrium models of the Japanese reserve market for before and after July
1995, we show that, for the subperiod to March 2001, only the call rate should be
used as the BOJ’s policy indicator. However, for the subperiod from April 2001,
an equally weighted average of the call rate and reserves should be used.
Therefore, in this paper, we empirically demonstrate that individual monetary
variables alone cannot explain the BOJ’s past policy decisions over time.
Furthermore, we present the BOJ’s policy measure that is useful for the entire
period from January 1980 to May 2003 by utilizing Bernanke and Mihov’s meth-
odology. The derived policy measure provides an explanation of the BOJ’s his-
torical decisions over time.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the differences in
the BOJ’s implementation of discount-window policy over time, and its differ-
ences from the Fed. Section 3 sets up two equilibrium models of the Japanese
reserve market for before and after July 1995 by applying the econometric meth-
odology of Bernanke and Mihov ?1998?. In Section 4, we discuss the data set
and statistical methodology for estimating the two equilibrium models. Section
5 reports estimation results and develops a policy measure of the BOJ. In this
section, we also examine the plausibility of the derived policy measure by con-
ducting an impulse response analysis. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The BOJ’s Discount-Window Policy
Applying Bernanke and Mihov’s structural VAR methodology involves devel-
oping equilibrium econometric models of the reserve market. In particular, when
modelling the Japanese reserve market, it should be noted that the introduction
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of a low interest-rate policy in July 1995 shifted the BOJ’s discount-window pol-
icy.
At first, to develop an equilibrium model of the reserve market, we must un-
derstand the central bank’s policy behaviour in the reserve market ; i.e., how it
supplies high-powered money ?reserves plus currency?. In general, central
banks have two ways of controlling the supply of high-powered money. One is
to engage in open-market operations and the other is to engage in discount-
window lending. In particular, management of the discount window takes two
forms depending on the relationship between the discount rate and short-term
policy rates such as the call rate and the federal funds rate. One form relates to
the way in which a central bank sets the discount rate below the short-term pol-
icy rate. The other relates to the way in which it sets the short-term rate below
the discount rate.
Historically, the BOJ has adopted both forms of discount-window policy.
Figure 1 shows paths of the call rate and the discount rate, which indicate that
the discount rate remained below the call rate until June 1995 and has remained
above it since July 1995, when the BOJ implemented a low interest-rate policy.
This suggests that management of the BOJ’s discount-window policy before June
1995 was similar to that of the Fed, because the U.S. discount rate is persistently
below the federal funds rate. However, there is an important difference. The
BOJ eased ?tightened? policy by increasing ?reducing? discount-window borrow-
ing quotas for private banks. Therefore, the BOJ took the initiative to control the
level of discount-window lending and regulated the quantity of borrowing.
Because moral suasion is not used in Japan in the manner used by the Fed to re-
duce discount-window borrowing, private banks usually borrow their quota
amounts. In the literature on Japan’s monetary policy, this type of management
??
of the BOJ’s discount window is generally termed ‘credit rationing’
???
. On the other
hand, in the literature on U.S. monetary policy, it is supposed that borrowing
from the Fed depends on private banks’ decisions, and that the Fed endoge-
nously accommodates the demand for discount-window borrowing by private
banks. To model the Japanese reserve market, we must consider differences be-
tween discount-window management in Japan and the U.S.
???
In July 1995, the BOJ, by setting the discount rate above the call rate, con-
verted the discount rate into a penalty rate. The penalty rate eliminates the need
for rationing at the discount window, and private banks usually have no incentive
to borrow from the BOJ. Therefore, the BOJ’s discount window accommodates
demand shocks for discount-window borrowing provided that systemic risk in the
short-term money market makes it difficult for private banks to obtain finance in
this market.
Given the history of the BOJ’s discount-window policy, we must develop two
equilibrium models of the Japanese reserve market : for before and after June
1995. In the following section, we present two equilibrium models of the
Japanese reserve market. One is the Credit Rationing ?CR? model, applicable up
to June 1995, and the other is the Low Interest-rate Policy ?LIP? model, applica-
ble from July 1995.
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??? Hamada and Iwata ?1980? and Honda ?1984? each developed theoretical models of
the credit-rationing view, and the former used empirical analysis to support their view.
Furthermore, Ueda ?1993? stated ‘The discount rate has always been lower than the
call rate. Therefore, discount-window lending has been rationed in Japan. And the level
of lending has been changed by the BOJ, not by private banks’ ?p. 12, lines 1719?.
??? The type of discount-window policy pursued by the U.S. is generally referred to as
the ‘implicit cost regime’ in the literature on Japan’s monetary policy.
3 Two Models of the Japanese Reserve Market
In this section, we introduce Bernanke-Mihov’s structural VAR model and set
up two equilibrium models of the Japanese Reserve Market by considering the
shift in the discount-window policy and the institutional differences between op-
erating procedures in Japan and the U.S.
3?1 Bernanke and Mihov’s Methodology
To determine the actual policy measure of the BOJ, we follow Bernanke and
Mihov in supposing that the economy is described by the linear structural model
given by equations ??? and ???:
 





 ???
 





 ???
where variables in bold type denote vectors or matrices.
Following Bernanke and Mihov, we refer to  and  as ‘non-policy’ and
‘policy’ variables, respectively. The set of policy variables includes variables that
are potentially useful as direct indicators of the stance of monetary policy, such
as short-term interest rates and reserve measures. Non-policy variables include
other economic variables, such as output and inflation. In equations ??? and
???, the are mutually uncorrelated ‘structural’ or ‘primitive’ disturbances.
In particular, one element of  is a money-supply shock or monetary-policy
shock. The other elements of may include shocks to money demand or any
disturbance that affects the policy variables.
Bernanke and Mihov assumed that the non-policy variables,, depend only on
??
lagged values of the policy variables ??0?. Given the timing assumption, the
system given by ??? and ??? can be rewritten in VAR form ?with only lagged
variables on the right-hand side? and estimated by standard methods. As in
Bernanke and Mihov, letbe the parts of the VAR residuals in the policy block
that are orthogonal to the VAR residuals in the non-policy block. Then Bernanke
and Mihov showed that satisfies :
 ???
Equation ??? is a standard structural VAR system, which relates observable
VAR-based innovations,, to unobservable structural shocks,. The Bernanke-
Mihov methodology involves identifying exogenous components of monetary pol-
icy and examining policy indicators by developing equilibrium models of the
reserve market in the form of ???.
3?2 Before June 1995?CR ?Credit Rationing? Model
The following system, ??????, describes the CR model :
	
 ???
	
	
 ???
 ???
 ???
	
	
 ???
	
	
 ???
where gd, cu, re, br and mo denote government deposits, currency, reserves,
borrowed reserves and assets held through open-market operations by the BOJ,
respectively, and r denotes the call rate.
Equation ??? is the market-equilibrium condition for bank reserves, which is
based on an identity between assets and liabilities on the BOJ’s balance sheet
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?see Table 1?.
???
Equation ??? implies that the BOJ accommodates fluctuations in
the demand for government funds, . Equation ??? relates innovations in the
demand for currency, , to innovations in the call rate, , and an autonomous
shock to currency demand, . Similarly, equation ??? represents the bank’s
demand for reserves, expressed in the form of innovations : it states that innova-
tions in the demand for reserves,, depend negatively on innovations in the call
rate, , and on a reserve demand shock, .
Equation ??? represents the distinguishing feature of the CR model. It shows
that the BOJ controls the level of discount-window lending and rations lending to
private banks. Hence, we interpret this equation as a behaviour function for the
BOJ. In particular, represents the supply shock for discount-window lending
and is defined as a policy shock.
???
Equation ??? is the second behaviour function
in the CR model, and it shows how the BOJ supplies high-powered money by
??
??? It is important to note that, unlike the Fed, the BOJ has not used the concept of
non-borrowed reserves. This is a major difference between the operating procedures of
the BOJ and those of the Fed. Bernanke and Mihov’s econometric model of the U.S. re-
serve market incorporates an equilibrium condition for total reserves, ?member-bank
deposits plus vault cash??borrowed reserves+non-borrowed reserves. Kasa and
Popper ?1997? have already applied the Bernanke-Mihov methodology to Japanese
monetary policy. However, their analysis is deficient because it uses the concept of
non-borrowed reserves : it does not take account of the institutional differences between
Japan and the U.S.
??? Equation ??? indicates another major difference between the operating proce-
dures of the BOJ and those of the Fed. In the literature on U.S. monetary policy, it is
supposed that private banks are reluctant to borrow from the discount window because
of various sanctions and restrictions imposed by the Fed on banks’ use of the window.
Hence, the Fed only accommodates demand for discount-window borrowing by private
banks. Specifically, Bernanke and Mihov used a conventional borrowing function, in
which borrowing depends positively on the spread between the funds rate and the dis-
count rate. Using data to June 1995, Nakashima ?2006? found strong evidence against
a model of the Japanese reserve market that incorporates a U.S.-type borrowing function
rather than one of the form of equation ???.
using open-market operations. In particular,  represents the high-powered
money supply shock from using open-market operations and can be considered
as the second monetary-policy shock, with in equation ??? being the first.
The CR model implies that the BOJ affects the short-term money market and
the macroeconomy through both open-market operations and discount-window
lending, because the model has two BOJ behaviour functions. Furthermore, the
two BOJ behaviour functions are essentially equivalent in that they are high-
powered money supply functions of the BOJ. Therefore, in the CR model, it is
the quantity, rather than the composition, of high-powered money that matters.
Hence, adding equations ??? and ??? yields the following system, which is es-
sentially equivalent to the CR model.
	

		




		

 ????
In this context, the VAR innovation, , is defined as follows.

The above system can be represented in the form of equation ??? as follows.

   
   
   
   
















	

   
   
   
	 
  
















	

 	 
   
 	 
   
Inverting the above relationship reveals how the monetary policy shock, ,
depends on the VAR innovations.
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	
		
	
 ????
The CR model described by the above system has nine unknown parameters
?including the variances of four structural shocks? to be estimated from 10
covariances. Hence, there is one overidentifying restriction.
3?3 After July 1995?LIP ?Low Interest-rate Policy? Model
The following system of equations describes the LIP model.
	
	

	
	
		

		 ????
	
	
		 ????
The structure of the LIP model differs from that of the CR model in equation
????. This equation indicates that the BOJ passively accommodates the demand
shock for discount-window borrowing by private banks, vbr. Equation ???? rep-
resents the open-market operations behaviour of the BOJ. The LIP model as-
sumes that the BOJ can use only open-market operations to supply high-powered
money proactively. Therefore, the high-powered money supply shock, , is de-
fined as the monetary-policy shock of the BOJ in this model. Consequently, the
LIP model can be written in the form of equation ??? as follows.

    
    
    
    
    
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One can also invert the above relationship to determine how the monetary pol-
icy shock, 	, depends on the VAR innovations.
	




 ????
The LIP model described by the above structural VAR system has 11 un-
known parameters ?including the variances of five structural shocks? to be esti-
mated from 15 covariances. Hence, there are four overidentifying restrictions.
3?4 Theoretical Models for Alternative Operating Procedures
Parameters in the BOJ behaviour functions, given by equation ???? in the CR
model and by equation ???? in the LIP model, define how the BOJ controls the
market for bank reserves in each model. For example, the proposition that the
BOJ targets only the call rate can be represented by three additional restrictions
in the CR model,, and, and by four additional restrictions in
the LIP model, , , and 
. In this case, the monetary
policy shocks can be recovered by using the VAR innovations to the call rate.
According to this proposition, the call rate provides the best policy indicator of
the BOJ. We call this model CL ?Call Rates Targeting? model. On the other
hand, the proposition that the BOJ targets only the high-powered money can be
represented by three additional restrictions in the CR model, , and
, and by four additional restrictions in the LIP model, , ,
and 
. We call this model HP ?High-Powered Money Targeting?
model.
Alternative propositions that define the BOJ’s policy in terms of both the call
rate and quantity indicators, such as currency and reserves, can also be
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represented by parametric restrictions in the BOJ behaviour functions. For ex-
ample, the proposition that the BOJ targets both the call rate and reserves can
be written in terms of two additional restrictions in the CR model, and
, and three additional restrictions in the LIP model, , and
. In this case, the policy shocks can be recovered by using linear combi-
nations of the VAR innovations to the call rate and reserves. According to this
proposition, a hybrid variable comprising the call rate and reserves provides a
good policy indicator of the BOJ. Hence, imposing various parametric restric-
tions on equations ???? and ????, respectively, yields six alternative models that
are nested within the CR and LIP models. In particular, we describe two of the
six models as single-targeting models, which assume that the BOJ targets a sin-
gle monetary variable, while four are described as mixed-targeting models, which
assume that the BOJ targets a combination of the following policy-sector vari-
ables : the call rate, currency, reserves and high-powered money ?currency plus
reserves?.
??
Figure 2 : The Bank of Japan’s Policy Measure
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Table 2 presents the models, which imply different forms of BOJ operating
procedures. In what follows, we examine the BOJ’s policy indicator by estimat-
ing the six alternative models and the CR and LIP models.
4 Data and Estimation Method
The Bernanke-Mihov methodology accommodates the inclusion of both policy
variables and non-policy variables in the VAR system ?1? and ?2?. Included in
the non-policy sector are the output gap ?? for the industrial production index
?1995?100, seasonally adjusted? and the rate of inflation ?? in the consumer
price index ?1995?100, excluding food products?. As explained in Subsection
3?1, the estimation of the structural VAR system ?3? needs policy-sector innova-
tionsthat are ‘orthogonal’ to non-policy sector innovations. Hence, compared
with policy variables, non-policy variables play only a minor role in the
Bernanke-Mihov methodology. We limit the inclusion of non-policy variables to
a bare minimum.
???
The output gap was measured by using percentage deviations
from the trend, which was constructed by using the Hodrick. Prescott filter.
???
The
consumer price index is seasonally adjusted by the X11 method, and the inflation
rate is annual.
Consider the policy variables in the VAR system. As discussed in Subsections
3?2 and 3?3, the development of equilibrium models of the market for bank re-
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??? Indeed, we also include the exchange-rate gap or the money-supply gap of M2+CD,
each constructed in a manner similar to producing the output gap, as one of the non-
policy variables, but the inclusion of the new variables does not affect at all our estima-
tion results for the structural VAR system ?3?.
??? To apply the Hodrick-Prescott filter, we used a value of the smoothing parameter
for monthly data of 129,600, as proposed by Ravin and Uhlig ?2002?. We also used a
quadratic trend to obtain a measure of the output gap. The choice of the trends does not
materially affect the results.
serves involves the use of identities between assets and liabilities in the BOJ’s
balance sheet ?Table 1?. Government deposits ?GD?, currency ?CU? and re-
serves ?RE? are used for liabilities. Furthermore, ‘the assets held via open-
market operations ?MO?’, which comprise bills, bonds and overseas assets
acquired by the BOJ through these operations, are used for assets.
???
In addition to
these four variables, the call rate ?R? is included in the policy sector.
???
Therefore,
we estimate the seven-variable VAR system for , , GD, CU, RE, R and MO.
All data were obtained from the Nikkei NEEDS, and the sample period is from
January 1976 to May 2003.
????
To determine the number of lags in the VAR sys-
??
??? Each equilibrium condition in the CR and LIP models requires one of the quantity
variables in the policy sector to be redundant. Therefore, we exclude borrowed re-
serves ?BR? from the policy sector.
??? For details of MO, see Appendix A. Normalizing the policy-sector variables, except
for R, causes log-linear estimation to violate the identity relationship between assets
and liabilities. To deal with this problem, Bernanke and Mihov suggested that the pol-
icy-sector variables should be normalized by using a 36-month moving average of past
values of total reserves. We adopt this approach by normalizing the policy-sector vari-
ables by using a 36-month moving average of past values of ‘the BOJ’s assets held via
open-market operations and discount-window lending ?MD?’, generated by summing
MO and discount-window lending. For details of MD, see Appendix A.
???? A primary reason for omitting the period after May 2003 is that in May 2003, the
BOJ significantly revised statistics from the Bank of Japan accounts, which comprises
statistics on reserves, currency, borrowed reserves, government deposits and foreign
assets. Because of this revision, statistics before and after May 2003 are incompatible.
Because this break significantly affects our analysis of the BOJ’s operating procedures,
we omit the period from June 2003.
Table 1 : The BOJ’s Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
Discount-window Lending ?? Government Deposits ??
Assets Held via Open-Market Operations ?	? Currency Held by the Public ?
?
?Security, Float, Other Net Assets? Bank Deposits ??
tems, we applied the Akaike Information Criterion ?AIC?. This criterion sug-
gested 15 lags.
????
To estimate the CR and LIP models, we use a two-step procedure. In the first
step, by assuming the stability of the reduced-form VAR over time, we estimate
the VAR using equation-by-equation OLS estimation for the full-sample period
from 1976 to 2003.
????
OLS estimation generates two non-policy sector VAR inno-
vations and five policy-sector VAR innovations. Furthermore, we regress each
of the five policy-sector VAR innovations on the two non-policy sector VAR inno-
vations using OLS estimation in order to obtain five policy-sector innovations of
andthat are ‘orthogonal’ to the non-policy sector innovations.
For post-1995 estimation of the LIP model, we can use the five orthogonal inno-
vations. However, pre1995 estimation of the CR model requires the construction
of, which is the innovation of ‘the assets held via open-market operations and
discount-window lending ?MD?’. To obtain , after generating 	 from
and by using the market-equilibrium condition in equation ???,
we add	and. Therefore, for pre-June 1995 estimation of the CR model, we
use the four policy-sector innovations of  and
????
. In addition, for
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???? We also applied the Schwartz-Bayesian Information Criteria ?SBIC? and the
Hannan and Quinn information criterion ?HQIC?. The former criterion suggested six
lags, and the latter criterion suggested nine lags. We estimate the VAR systems with
six lags, and nine through 17 lags. The ordering of the VARs does not qualitatively af-
fect our estimation results reported in Section 5.
???? In Section 5, we examine the stability of the reduced-form VAR for the full period
in detail.
???? We can also estimate the CR model by directly using ‘the assets held via open-
market operations and discount-window lending ?MD?’, which comprises MO and dis-
count-window lending. This requires estimation of the six-variable VAR system ?in 
,
, GD, CU, R and MD? for the CR model. The author confirms that there is no signifi-
cant difference between the estimation results for the CR model based on the six-
variable VAR and those based on the seven-variable VAR. However, the use of the six-
post-1995 estimation of the LIP model, we must take it into account that, in
March 2001, the BOJ officially adopted a new operating procedure by targeting
the level of reserves as much as by continuing with the so-called zero interest-
rate policy. We should carefully examine whether the LIP model can capture this
change in the BOJ’s operating procedures in March 2001. Hence, for pre-and
post-2001 estimation of the LIP model, we split the five policy-sector VAR inno-
vations, which are generated for post-1995 estimation of the LIP model, at March
2001. Thus, we conduct not only post-1995 estimation of the LIP model but also
pre-and post-2001 estimation of it, and thereby carefully examine the change in
the BOJ’s operating procedures in 2001.
In the second step, full-information maximum likelihood estimation is applied
to the structural VAR system of equation ???. The log likelihood function to be
maximized is as follows :



	
		
?
 
where  is the estimate of the covariance matrix of the policy-sector innova-
tions and  is the diagonal matrix that diagonally locates the variances of the
structural shocks.
????
Following Bernanke and Mihov, we performed two types of
??
variable VAR requires estimation of separate VAR systems for the pre-and post-1995
periods. Therefore, the CR and LIP models on different VAR systems differ not only in
their contemporaneous structures of the reserve market but also in their dynamic struc-
tures of the macroeconomy. Given that we are attempting to identify a useful policy
measure over time by focusing on the difference in the contemporaneous structure of
the reserve market before and after 1995, it is important to minimize differences be-
tween the two models through the use of a single VAR system. This approach is
adopted in this paper.
???? To conduct the full-information maximum likelihood estimation, we employ the
BFGS algorithm in the Constrained Maximum Likelihood Estimation ?CML? GAUSS
package.
test on the models : ?1? tests of the validity of the full set of overidentifying re-
strictions, and ?2? joint hypothesis tests on parametric restrictions with the sin-
gle and mixed-targeting models, conditional on the validity of both the CR and
LIP models.
For ease of interpretation, we define ‘weighting parameters’,, in the CR, LIP
and mixed-targeting models. The weighting parameters are the absolute values
of the parameters corresponding to the VAR innovations in the BOJ behaviour
functions, ?10? and ?13?. The absolute values in the behaviour functions are
normalized to sum to unity. For example, the weighting parameters in the CR
model are :
		
where 	. Each  satisfies 
, 
, and 		, where 


????
	
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we report estimation results for the equilibrium models of
Japanese reserve markets, and we develop the BOJ’s policy measure. In addi-
tion, we examine the plausibility of the derived policy measure by conducting an
impulse response analysis.
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???? Similarly, the weighting parameters in the LIP model are :
		
where 	Each  satisfies 

 and 		where 

	. The weighting parameters in each of the
four mixed-targeting models, including the CL-CU-RE, CL-CU, CL-RE and CL-HP
models, shown in Table 2, are defined similarly.
5?1 Stability of VAR System
Our two-step procedure for estimating the structural VAR system ?3? as-
sumes the stability of the seven-variable VAR system over time. In this subsec-
tion, we examine the stability of the reduced-form VAR by employing the three
types of Lagrange multiplier ?LM? test, the Sup LM, the Exp LM, and the Ave
??
Table 2 : Alternative Models for the BOJ’s Operating Procedures
CR Model ?Before June 1995?
Models
BOJ Equations
Monetary Policy Shocks
  
CL ?Call Rate? 1.00 1.00 1.00 	

HP ?High-powered Money? 1.00 0.00 0.00 	
CL-CU-RE 1.00 ? ?
	


CL-CU 1.00 ? 1.00 	

CL-RE 1.00 1.00 ? 	

CL-HP 1.00  	

LIP Model ?After July 1995?
Models
BOJ Equations
Monetary Policy Shocks
   
CL ?Call Rate? 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 

HP ?High-powered Money? 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CL-CU-RE 1.00 ? ? 1.00



CL-CU 1.00 ? 1.00 1.00 

CL-RE 1.00 1.00 ? 1.00 

CL-HP 1.00  1.00 


1?CL, HP, CU and RE imply the call rate, high-powered money, currency and reserves, respec-
tively.
2?We descrive the CL and HP models as single-targeting models, which assume that the BOJ tar-
gets a single-monetary variable.
3. We descrive the CL-CU-RE, CL-CU, CL-RE and CL-HP models as mixed-targeting models,
which assume that the BOJ targets a combination of the following policy-sector variables : CL,
HP, CU and RE.
LM test, proposed by Andrews ?1993? and Andrews and Ploberger ?1994?. In
the tests of structural change, the null hypothesis of parameter stability of each
of seven equations in the reduced-form VAR is tested against the alternative hy-
pothesis of parameter instability. Furthermore, we use the methodology pre-
sented by Hansen ?1997? to calculate asymptotic -values for the structural
change tests.
????
Each equation in the seven-variable VAR system is estimated with
six lags.
Table 3 reports the test results of parameter stability for each equation. For
the non-policy sector equations, there is no strong evidence against parameter
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???? We compute the LM test statistics and the corresponding -values using the
GAUSS code programmed by Professor Bruce Hansen. The LM statistics are computed
using the middle 70 per cent of the sample.
Table 3 : Test Results for Structural Change of the VAR System
Variables
Sup LM Exp LM Ave LM
Test
statistics
Asymptotic
-values
Test
statistics
Asymptotic
-values
Test
statistics
Asymptotic
-values
Non-policy Sector
 60.8 0.10 26.5 0.11 48.8 0.02
 83.2 0.00 36.3 0.00 34.5 0.58
Policy Sector
GD 63.5 0.06 28.3 0.05 44.2 0.08
CU 61.5 0.09 26.5 0.11 37.5 0.37
RE 63.0 0.07 28.0 0.06 44.5 0.07
R 87.0 0.00 39.1 0.00 45.8 0.05
MO 57.3 0.19 25.7 0.14 46.5 0.09
1?Each equation in the seven variable VAR system is estimated with 6 lags.
2?LM denotes the Lagrange multiplier statistic of the null hypothesis of no structural change.
3?Sup LM denotes the sup test for structural change proposed by Andrews ?1993?. Exp LM and
Ave LM, respectively, denote the exponential test and the average test proposed by Andrews
and Ploberger ?1994?.
4?Asymptotic -values for the structural-change tests are computed using the methodology pro-
posed by Hansen ?1997?.
stability. Parameter stability of the output-gap ?? equation is not rejected at the
five per cent level of significance by the Sup LM and the Exp LM tests, and at
the one per cent level of significance by the Ave LM test. Furthermore, parame-
ter stability of the inflation equation ?? is not rejected at the five per cent level
of significance by the Ave LM test.
For the policy sector equations, the LM test statistics also support parameter
stability over time. The Sup LM, Exp LM, and Ave LM tests do not reject pa-
rameter stability for each of government deposits ?GD?, currency ?CU?, re-
serves ?RE?, and market operations ?MO? equations at the five per cent level
of significance. Parameter stability for the call rate ?R? equation is not rejected
at the five per cent level of significance by the Ave LM test. Overall, our esti-
mated VAR system seems to pass the structural change tests. Stability of the re-
duced form VAR system is also accepted for shorter lag lengths ?e.g., three or
four lags?.
5?2 Estimation Results for the CR and LIP models
Next, we discuss estimation results for the CR and LIP models. Tables 4 and
5 report estimation results for the two models. Table 6 shows subperiodestima-
tion results for the LIP model. We take into account the following points.
????
1?For the pre-June 1995 period ?Table 4?, the parameter estimates of the BOJ
behaviour function in the CR and mixed-targeting models are close to unity.
This is consistent with the CL model being the most easily accepted, and
with the estimates of being relatively high. Furthermore, all other mod-
els except the HP model are easily accepted. These results indicate that the
??
???? In all 14 models, the parameter estimates of the demand functions are of the ex-
pected sign, although some estimates are not statistically significant.
call rate would be the best policy indicator of the BOJ for the period before
June 1995.
2?For the post-July 1995 period ?Table 5?, the HP model is rejected at the five
per cent level of significance, whereas the CL model is not rejected. The
LIP model and the two mixed-targeting models, the CL-CU-RE and CL-RE
models, are accepted with better p-values than the CL model. In particular,
the estimates of in the three models indicate that the BOJ has been con-
cerned about the call rate and reserves. These results imply that the
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Table 4 : Estimation Results from the Credit Rationing ?CR? Model
?1976 : 11995 : 6?
Models
Demand Equations BOJ Equations
OIR JOINT
Weights
    	
 	  	
 
CR
0.04 0.05 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.52
? 0.75 0.08 0.08 0.08
?0.05? ?0.06? ?0.01? ?0.12? ?0.01? ?0.21?
CL
0.02 0.02
1.00 1.00 1.00
1.91 0.38
? ? ? ?
?0.02? ?0.02? ?0.75? ?0.94?
HP
0.03 0.03
1.00 0.00 0.00
179 179
? ? ? ?
?0.01? ?0.00? ?0.00? ?0.00?
CL-CU-RE
0.07 0.07
1.00
0.99 0.99 1.56 0.03
0.87 0.06 0.06 ?
?0.04? ?0.05? ?0.13? ?0.15? ?0.46? ?0.86?
CL-CU
0.06 0.02
1.00
0.99
1.00
2.71 0.74
0.89 0.10 ? ?
?0.01? ?0.02? ?0.01? ?0.44? ?0.69?
CL-RE
0.01 0.02
1.00 1.00
0.99 1.91 0.39
0.75 ? 0.24 ?
?0.01? ?0.02? ?0.01? ?0.59? ?0.82?
CL-HP
0.07 0.07
1.00
0.99 0.99 1.56 0.03
0.93 0.06 0.06 ?
?0.05? ?0.04? ?0.03? ?0.03? ?0.67? ?0.98?
1?For the Demand Equations and BOJ Equations, standard errors are in parentheses.
2?OIR and Joint indicate overidentifying restrictions test statistics and joint test statistics, respec-
tively. p-values are in parentheses.
3?A likelihood ratio test was used to test the overidentifying restrictions. The degrees of free-
dom are one for the CR model, four for the CL and HP models, two for the CL-CU-RE model
and three for the CL-CU, CL-RE and CL-HP models.
4?A likelihood ratio test was used to test the joint hypotheses. The degrees of freedom are three
for the CL and HP models, one for the CL-CU-RE model and two for the CL-CU, CL-RE and
CL-HP models.
accurate grasp of the BOJ’s policy decisions for the post-July 1995 period re-
quires using not only the call rate but also reserves.
3?For the post-July 1995 period, estimation results for before and after March
2001 differ ?Table 6?. For the first subperiod, before March 2001, the pa-
rameter estimates of the BOJ behaviour function in the LIP and mixed-
targeting models are close to unity. In addition, the CL model is easily
accepted, whereas the HP model is strongly rejected. These results suggest
that the call rate would be the policy indicator of the BOJ for the pre-March
??
Table 5 : Estimation Results from the Low Interest Rates ?LIP? Model
?1995 : 72003 : 5?
Models
Demand Equations BOJ Equations
OIR JOINT
Weights
      	
 	 	
 	 	
LIP
0.06 0.43 0.99 0.92 0.61 0.96 2.31
? 0.37 0.04 0.49 0.04 0.06
?0.03? ?0.02? ?0.03? ?0.11? ?0.03? ?0.03??0.68?
CL
0.04 0.25
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
11.1 6.13
? ? ? ? ?
?0.03? ?0.05? ?0.19? ?0.19?
HP
0.05 0.31
1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
66.0 61.0
? ? ? ? ?
?0.01? ?0.02? ?0.00? ?0.00?
CL-CU-RE
0.07 0.43
1.00
0.88 0.61
1.00
8.05 4.29
0.40 0.14 0.45 ? ?
?0.03? ?0.03? ?0.11? ?0.03? ?0.33? ?0.12?
CL-CU
0.15 0.14
1.00
0.99
1.00 1.00
20.2 16.2
0.99 0.01 ? ? ?
?0.05? ?0.05? ?0.01? ?0.00? ?0.02?
CL-RE
0.05 0.41
1.00 1.00
0.58
1.00
7.32 5.42
0.40 ? 0.60 ? ?
?0.02? ?0.02? ?0.04? ?0.39? ?0.14?
CL-HP
0.04 0.15
1.00
0.99 0.99
1.00
16.2 10.5
1.00 0.00 0.00 ? ?
?0.02? ?0.01? ?0.06? ?0.06? ?0.02? ?0.00?
1?For the Demand Equations and BOJ Equations, standard errors are in parentheses.
2?OIR and Joint indicate overidentifying restrictions test statistics and joint test statistics, respec-
tively. pvalues are in parentheses.
3?A likelihood ratio test was used to test the overidentifying restrictions. The degrees of free-
dom are four for the LIP model, eight for the CL and HP models, six for the CL-CU-RE model
and seven for the CL-CU, CL-RE and CL-HP models.
4?A likelihood ratio test was used to test the joint hypotheses. The degrees of freedom are four
for the CL and HP models, two for the CL-CU-RE model and three for the CL-CU, CL-RE and
CL-HP models.
2001 period.
4?For the second subperiod, from April 2001, the single-targeting models, the
CL and HP models, are rejected at the five per cent level of significance.
However, the LIP model and the two mixed-targeting models, the CL-CU-
RE and CL-RE models, are easily accepted. In particular, the estimates of
 in the three models indicate that, since April 2001, the BOJ has been
equally concerned about the call rate and reserves. These results suggest
that an equally weighted average of the call rate and reserves can be used
as the policy indicator of the BOJ in the post-April 2001 period.
Each of the estimation results for the post-July 1995 and post-April 2001 peri-
ods reasonably reflects the change in the BOJ’s operating procedures in 2001. In
addition, the estimation result for the post-July 1995 period is consistent with
that for each of the pre-and post-2001 periods. Hence, taking the pre-June 1995
and pre-March 2001 results into account, we conclude that the call rate alone
represents the BOJ’s actual policy decisions for the pre-March 2001 period, in-
cluding the pre-June 1995 period. On the other hand, for the post-April 2001 pe-
riod, an equally weighted average of the call rate and reserves can capture the
BOJ’s policy decisions.
5?3 The Policy Measure of the BOJ
The estimation results suggest that the composition of the BOJ’s policy meas-
ure might differ between periods. Hence, to calculate a useful policy measure
over time, we apply the method proposed by Bernanke and Mihov. First, we cal-
culate the sum of the policy shock and the corresponding element of
. Specifically, in terms of equation ???, this is the fourth element
in the context of the CR model and its six associated models, and is the fifth
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element in the context of the LIP and its six associated models. We plug the es-
timate of  and  from each estimation for the pre-June 1995, July 1995 to
March 2001 and post-April 2001 periods into the corresponding rows of
in each of the 14 models. For the CR model and its six associated
models, includes the four policy variables, R, RE, CU and GD, while for the
LIP model and its six associated models, includes the five policy variables, R,
MO, RE, CU, GD. This procedure generates seven series in the three periods.
Next, we normalize the p-values of the tests of the overidentifying restrictions
performed in each subperiod so that they sum to unity. Using the normalized
values, we derive a weighted average policy measure in each period. Then, we
normalize the calculated policy measure at each date by subtracting it from a 36-
month moving average of its own past values over the entire period. This im-
plies that zero is the benchmark for ‘normal’ monetary policy ?‘normal’ at least
in terms of recent experience?, and that positive values indicate an easing of
monetary policy, while negative values indicate a tightening.
????
??
?18? The issue of how we should define normal ?or neutral? policy is an important
macroeconomic issue. Following Bernanke and Mihov, we use the 36-month moving av-
erage method to derive a neutral policy indicator in each month. As an alternative to our
neutral policy indicator, arguably, the natural rate of interest, which is the real short-
term interest rate consistent with output being at its natural rate and inflation being con-
stant, is the most appropriate indicator of neutral policy ?see, e.g., Blinder ?1998??.
However, the use of the natural real interest rate is problematic for two reasons. First,
the standard approach to calculating the path of the natural rate has not yet been estab-
lished. As Laubach and Williams ?2003? have pointed out, econometric estimates of the
natural rate of interest are imprecise. Second, quantitative conceptualization of the
BOJ’s policy stance based on the natural rate of interest is quite inconsistent with the
framework of this paper. This is because the BOJ’s policy indicator obtained by using
estimates from the CR, LIP and their associated models implies different monetary in-
dicators, including the call rate, reserves and currency, which are not measured in com-
parable units. The moving average method proposed by Bernanke and Mihov has the
advantage of alleviating this problem of inconsistent units of measurement. Hence, in
Figure 2 shows the obtained policy measure from January 1980 to May 2003.
The policy measure is scaled so that it has the same variance as the call rate.
Several features are noteworthy.
1?After a temporary tightening immediately following the Plaza Agreement of
September 1985, the policy stance in the late 1980s was substantially
expansionary.
2?In the early 1990s, when the bubble economy of the late 1980s burst, the
policy stance was contractionary.
3?In the mid 1990s, the policy stance was expansionary at the beginning of the
period of the low interest-rate policy in June 1995. After that, the policy
stance in the late 1990s was neutral.
4?Except for a temporary tightening involving raising the call rate in August
2000, the policy stance has been expansionary since the beginning of the
quantitative easing of policy in March 2001.
5?4 Discussion
The previous section has presented a policy measure of the BOJ that repre-
sents its past policy decisions over time. This section discusses the plausibility
of the obtained policy measure by using impulse response functions.
Analogously to Bernanke and Mihov’s VAR system, given by equations ???
and ???, we assume that the economy is described by the following linear struc-
tural model :
 






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what follows, we measure the BOJ’s policy stance based on the neutral policy indicator
obtained by using the moving average method.



 


 
where is the obtained policy measure. The vector of non-policy variables in
the VAR is given by , which includes the output gap for industrial
production ?? and the rate of inflation ??. The  and  terms indicate the
uncorrelated structural disturbances, an output shock, an inflation shock, and a
policy shock to the system. The AIC suggests the use of 12 lags in the VAR
system.
????
The identification of the structural shocks is achieved through a
Choleski decomposition, with the ordering of the variables as 
????
.
Figure 3 shows the estimated impulse response to an expansionary policy
shock of a one-standard-deviation increase in . Solid lines indicate point esti-
mates of impulse responses up to the 48th month. Dashed lines represent their
95 per cent confidence intervals, computed by using a Monte Carlo integration
with 1000 replications. The effect of the expansionary policy shock on output
builds gradually and reaches its peak after about one year, before declining back
to zero. The timing of the estimated peak and decline of output corresponds to
the estimated timing of the ‘policy tightening’, which indicates that the policy
measure becomes negative about one year after the expansionary shock. The ef-
fect on the inflation rate exhibits a modest ‘price puzzle’ and reaches its peak in
about two years.
The left column of Figure 4 shows the estimated responses to a positive out-
put shock, while the right column shows the estimated responses to an inflation
??
???? We examine the stability of the three-variable VAR system by employing the tests
of structural change proposed by Andrews ?1993? and Andrews and Ploberger ?1994?.
We confirm that our estimated VAR system passes the structural change tests.
???? To conduct impulse response analysis, we use the RATS ?Regression Analysis of
Time Series? software package.
shock. The impulse response conveys a plausible story : positive innovations to
output and inflation lead to policy tightenings, as captured by falls in the policy
measure. The pattern seems to confirm the ‘leaning against the wind’ story.
These impulse response results suggest that the obtained policy measure is
plausible.
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Figure 3 : Impulse Response to Policy Shock
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1?The figure shows the estimated impulse response to a one standard deviation policy shock.
2?The solid line and the dashed line represent point estimates and their 95 percent confidence
intervals, computed by using a Monte Carlo integration with 1000 replications, respectively.
6 Conclusion
The main conclusion of this paper is that no simple monetary measure repre-
sents the BOJ’s past policy decisions over time. In particular, we suggest that
the call rate should be used as the policy indicator of the BOJ to March 2001, and
that an equally weighted average of the call rate and reserves should be used as
the BOJ’s policy indicator from April 2001.
??
Figure 4 : Impulse Response to Output Shock and to Inflation Shock
Response to Output Shock
0
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1?The left column shows the estimated responses to a positive output shock, while the right
column shows the estimated responses to an inflation shock.
2?The solid line and the dashed line represent point estimates and their 95 percent confidence
intervals, computed by using a Monte Carlo integration with 1000 replications, respectively.
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This paper, by applying Bernanke and Mihov’s methodology, has presented a
useful measure of BOJ policy that identifies its past policy decisions over time.
One could use this indicator to conduct various exercises, including comparative
analyses of the BOJ’s actual and optimal decisions. We leave this and other
analysis using this measure to future research.
????
Appendix A: Constructing MO and MD
?Construction of MO:
First, we apply X11 to foreign assets ?net?, claims on government, claims
on deposit-money banks, lending to deposit-money banks, and unclassified
assets ?net?. Second, we subtract lending to deposit-money banks ?SA?
from the claims on deposit-money banks ?SA?.
????
The transformed data meas-
ure claims that the BOJ acquires via open-market operations on deposit-
money banks. Then, we define the sum of the transformed data, foreign
assets ?SA?, claims on government ?SA?, and the unclassified assets ?SA?
as MO: the BOJ’s assets held via open-market operations. All the data are
obtained from Nikkei NEEDS ?Monetary Survey, Accounts of Monetary
Authority?.
?Construction of MD:
After applying X11 to lending to deposit-money banks, we define the sum
of lending ?SA? and MO as MD: the BOJ’s assets held via open-market op-
erations and discount-window lending.
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